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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
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OPINION

FILE ONLY

Overstepping the bounds of duty?

By Stansfield Turner

TWO of the cardinal principles governing the United States military have been challenged by senior naval authorities. They are civilian control of the military and the noninvolvement of military men and women in domestic politics. The occasion was an annual symposium at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., just two weeks ago.

The War College provides midcareer education for naval officers in their early 30s to mid-40s. The objective is to broaden their understanding of their profession and ready them for higher responsibilities. A part of that broadening is an annual symposium with 250 to 300 business people, academicians, and news media representatives. In theory, the student officers who rub elbows for three days with these civilians will better understand where they and our military fit into American life. Not so this year. The tables were turned upside down.

Instead of the student-officers learning from the civilians, they and the civilians were lectured by senior naval officials on how civilian control of the military should be exercised and about which political party deals with military issues better.

Among others, Vice-Adm. James A. Lyons came up from Washington to tell the assemblage that the War Powers Resolution of Congress is "insidious" and an "impediment" that needs to be removed. That resolution establishes the circumstances under which a president can order military forces into action and those when he must obtain the concurrence of the Congress. Such division of authority over the military is a domestic political matter. It is part of the continual push and pull for power between the Congress and the presidency. The military has no business taking sides as to which form of civilian control it prefers — and will obey. Sen. Robert C. Byrd (D) of West Virginia described Admiral Lyons's remarks as "outrageous." He was right.

Admiral Lyons went on to praise the current Republican administration for its "very courageous political decision" to invade Grenada last October; he implied criticism of the previous Democratic administration for not standing by Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza and the Shah of Iran in 1979. If Admiral Lyons is campaigning for Ronald Reagan's reelection, it is against the law for him to do so while on active duty. The admiral needs to be reminded that the American people want their military to stay clear of domestic politics. We see enough of military meddling in politics in the rest of the world.

Military men must be prepared to offer forthright views on military matters, such as whether we are adequately prepared to defend our nation's interests with force if necessary and what the chances are for success if we do go to war. They have no business speaking up on essentially political issues, such as whether it is, or was, in the country's interests to employ military force. Our constitutional process does not provide for the military to play such a role. Beyond that, as Admiral Lyons has amply demonstrated, military men often tend to see complex political issues in starkly simple military terms.

The ill-advised remarks of one vice-admiral are not cause for widespread concern. Unfortunately there are other straws in the wind: Admiral Lyons is a protégé of the current secretary of the Navy and presumably reflects the secretary's views; a lieutenant general in the Marine Corps went equally off the reservation at the same symposium, so much so that President Reagan disavowed his remarks; the secretary of the Navy himself was at the symposium and neither then, nor since, has he expressed any concern at the overstepping of bounds by his uniformed subordinates; and there is an increasing amount of talk among military men, including some by Lyons at the symposium, that we may need to strike the first blow in the next war — a line of military reasoning that has pressured civilian decisionmakers over history to pull the trigger.

The United States military has far too deep a tradition of following civilian control and remaining aloof from domestic politics to be swayed easily by indiscretions such as were rampant in Newport. There was an exuberance there, however, that bespeaks improper civilian encouragement of the military into a political role and an unwise willingness of some military officers to fall into that trap. It is vital to the future of our military that both of these trends be arrested promptly.

Stansfield Turner is a former director of Central Intelligence and was president of the Naval War College from 1972 to 1974.

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COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW
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Warning: CIA censors at work

A look at how the agency treats its old boys — and its critics

by JACK HITT

President Reagan's National Security Decision Directive 84, which is already spreading a mantle of censorship over hundreds of thousands of present and future federal employees, has not yet been fully applied. Few doubt, though, that if Reagan is reelected — and unless Congress intervenes — the order will be implemented in its entirety despite persuasive arguments that it violates the First Amendment. If this should happen, how will the directive be applied? How speedy — and how fair — will the process be? Some light may be shed on these questions by examining how the CIA has, for years, been censoring books and articles by its alumni. If the experience of ex-CIA employees who have been through the mill is any guide, censorship under Directive 84 is likely to be, at best, slow, cumbersome, and capriciously applied.

The CIA's review system dates back to 1947, when the agency, at the time of its founding, devised a secrecy pledge to fulfill its statutory obligation "to protect sources and methods." For years this lifetime promise not to reveal agency secrets was rather informally policed. According to former CIA Director Stansfield Turner, a book or article submitted for review was sent on for vetting to whatever office seemed appropriate.

At first, the agency's problems with writers were few and minor. Then, in the early 1970s, the review system was legally challenged by a writer and CIA alumnus named Victor Marchetti. The Supreme Court refused to hear the case, however, tacitly concurring in a lower-court ruling that complete prior restraint of a former intelligence officer was no violation of the First Amendment.

Informal review continued for a while longer, but by 1977 so many former employees were writing about the CIA that Turner, who then headed the agency, decided to tidy up the process. He established a seven-member board, now known as the Publications Review Board, to take over the censorship job. Soon the CIA was again in court, this time defending itself against a former agent named Frank Snepp. Snepp, who had written a book about the evacuation of Saigon called *Decent Interval*, argued that his book contained no classified information — a point the CIA conceded — and that the secrecy agreement he had signed was not binding. The Supreme Court not only differed, but punished Snepp by assigning all his book-related earnings to the CIA.

The difficulties that writers have run into with the review board can be illustrated by the experience of Ralph McGehee. Disillusioned after twenty-five years with the agency, McGehee decided to write a book setting forth some of his criticisms. Under CIA procedure, he was not at liberty to consult a literary agent or a publisher until his manuscript had been passed by the CIA, and so he had to set to work on the book with no professional guidance. In February 1980 he submitted a draft to the PRB. The board initially found 397 "problems," and the CIA appointed a man whom the agency will identify only as "Bob" to work with McGehee. When the two men met, McGehee recalls, Bob greeted him by saying, "It's too bad you didn't work for the Israeli intelligence service. They know how to deal with people like you. They'd take you out and shoot you."

The two men clashed almost at once over the issue of when classified information can be deemed to have passed into the public domain. McGehee's book drew heavily on his experience during the six years he spent as a CIA officer in Thailand in the 1960s and early 1970s, and one key chapter focused on joint operations conducted by the CIA and the Thai government — operations which the CIA argued were still secret. Faced with the alternative of throwing out the chapter — and of seriously damaging the rest of the book — McGehee set out to prove that the CIA-Thai collaboration had long since become public.

In the version of the Pentagon Papers published by *The New York Times*, he found a memorandum discussing the specifics of that collaboration at some length. But Bob told McGehee that this was not good enough, since the official Defense Department version of the papers did not include the memo. McGehee eventually found the memo in a paperback edition of the Pentagon Papers edited by Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska. Even this did not satisfy Bob, who said that only someone in the executive branch, not a member of Congress, could legitimately declassify information. McGehee then produced newspaper clippings describing the CIA-Thai collaboration, and citing CIA sources. This wouldn't do either, Bob said, since the sources were not named. McGehee next came up with a clipping containing a reference to the joint operation by William Kinter, a former U.S.

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MONTGOMERY COUNTY EXPRESS (MD)
27 June 1984

Ex-CIA Chief Addresses Montgomery Village Rotary

by Marcus E. Myers

"It's not quite the same as the James Bond movies," remarked former Central Intelligence Agency director Admiral Stansfield Turner, referring to his spy command post during the Carter administration. "Unfortunately, there's no beautiful blondes on the French Riviera. And though there are risks to be taken, they are a different kind of risk...risks of judgment."

Turner, who served president Carter from 1977 until the Reagan administration came into office in 1981, was in Gaithersburg last Thursday to address the Montgomery Village Rotary, the area's newest Rotary club.

"I was really impressed with his candidness," said club member John LaFond. "He really raised a few eyebrows with his partisan views. And he made me stop and think when he talked about Reagan's 'Star Wars' defense approach."

Surprising remarks seem to be a Turner trademark. In a career that has taken him from Oxford's classrooms (where he was a Rhodes Scholar) to the military summit in Europe, where he was NATO commander for the southern flank, and even to the White House and service under Carter, Turner has been unafraid to speak his mind.

"That's bullshit," he quipped after his speech when asked about the differences leading to the increased American world leadership stature after president Carter left office. "That's pure bullshit. And you can quote me on that. Name one country where America lost influence during the Carter administration," he prodded. "There aren't any. And as a matter of fact," he alleged, "the United States lost more face in the Beirut situation under president Reagan than the Carter people lost during the entire four years."

On the topic of intelligence dominance, Turner also raised a few eyebrows. "The United States will always have an advantage over the Soviets," he said. "It's quite clear that we have a decided edge over the Russians in terms of technical intelligence collecting devices like electronic and space equipment. And we're at least equal to them in terms of human spy capacity. But the one advantage we will always have over the Soviets—which will in turn keep us ahead—is that no one in the world really believes in the Marxist-Communist system. Why? Because it doesn't work!

"Take a look at the three most important spheres in a society: economics, politics, and military. Only militarily can they compete. They're not even close economically or politically to any of the leading Western nations. Every time you read the papers you see where they are going to experiment with free-enterprise economics. But until they do away with their form of government they will never be able to compete."

Another advantage to the American intelligence system, says Turner, is the "free society in which we live. After gathering intelligence information," he explained, "it has to be interpreted. Given the fact that both sides may be able to interpret equally well, our advantage comes when this information is passed on to higher levels. Though I was often nervous in telling president Carter what I thought about some intelligence matters, I never really felt threatened for my job or my life; where, in a totalitarian system like the Soviets have, an intelligence officer will think twice before disagreeing with the president. And as I said, I never felt comfortable in saying, 'Mr. President, I think you're wrong.' But I knew the most important thing was to do what is best for the country. And our freedom allows us to do that better than any place else."

One of the more controversial moments of Turner's career occurred during the latter stages of the Carter administration: the aborted Iranian hostage rescue mission, which many feel contributed heavily to president Carter's re-election defeat.

"First of all," said Turner, "I feel very proud about the CIA's role in this mission. Possibly prouder than at any time in my military career. I served with your own Ken Youngmann [the Rotary member responsible for extending the invitation to Turner] in commissioning a ship during combat conditions during the Vietnam War. But I'm more proud of the CIA assist role than any other in my career.

"The mission failed for reasons that have yet to be probed," Turner continued. "Court Martial reviews should have been received, just as they should have after the Beirut conflict. But the rescue mission has taught us a great lesson.

"The mission failed because the commander decided not to proceed. He didn't proceed because three other men decided to abandon their mission because of mechanical reasons. But the real lesson should be concerning the four decisions that were all made in a conservative mode. No one risked their life for their country in a time of great crisis. You can't fault entirely the decisions each man made at the time. But it concerns me greatly that all four decisions didn't reflect the criticalness of the mission.

"Now is the time to take a nonpartisan look at this situation," Turner concluded, "in order to prepare ourselves for similar circumstances in the future."

Though Turner displayed an almost nonpartisan outlook in discussing most topics, his Democratic Party affiliation slipped out a bit when he addressed president Reagan's "Star Wars" aproach to defense.

"The speech was a dis-service to the public," Turner contended. "The Star Wars theory is a good idea, but it shouldn't be delivered as an alternative to offensive weapons such as President Reagan suggested. It's too early to rely on these defense systems because they haven't been proven. We should proceed with Star War, but not at the accelerated pace the president wants."

25 June 1984

TWO WHO LEFT T... SHARE LIFETIME R... OF EVERY WORD

THERE IS no love lost between Adm. Stansfield Turner and Frank Snepp, but they do share a common past and a present nightmare: They once worked for the Central Intelligence Agency and now everything they write is subjected to censorship.

"They will not even let me quote from my own [prior] speeches," says Turner, a former CIA director, in describing the problems he has had in getting a book he is writing approved for publication.

Snepp, a former CIA agent who is now teaching a journalism course in California and writing movie scripts, says: "Censorship renders you almost unemployable."

The nightmare they share could become routine for many more former federal employees, from Cabinet members on down, under the censorship program being pushed throughout the government by President Ronald Reagan. The same kind of lifetime prepublication review agreements that Turner and Snepp signed and that were confined to the intelligence agencies under previous administrations, are now being used as a model in numerous other departments and agencies. At present, about 200,000 current and former employees have signed them.

Under the agreements, everything Turner and Snepp write — books, speeches, memoirs, even letters to the editor — has to be approved by the CIA review board. In the future, unless Congress passes a pending bill that would ban what is known as prepublication review, such high-ranking officials as Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff also may have to get clearance before their words can reach the American public.

If Turner and Snepp are any guide, some former government officials may be in for a hard time when they get around to writing their memoirs. Turner, who has been critical of CIA covert activities conducted under the Reagan administration, has been trying for the past year to get his book about the CIA, which he calls "Secrecy in Democracy," cleared for publication.

There are three main areas that are causing problems, he said, but he was reluctant to discuss them because that, too, might be a violation of the rules. "If I told you, you would laugh out loud," he said in a telephone interview. In a subsequent interview, he commented that one of them involved the CIA's covert activities against Nicaragua — a topic that had been in the news for months even as the CIA board was excising references to it from his manuscript. The situation, he said, is "absurd."

There is a certain irony in Turner's and Snepp's being in the same boat. After he left the agency, Snepp wrote a book, "Decent Interval," that criticized the CIA's role in the fall of Saigon, but he refused to submit it for approval. Turner, who was his boss at the time, initiated proceedings against him.

Snepp had maintained that his book did not contain any classified information and that the nondisclosure agreement he had signed violated his First Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the nondisclosure agreement was a valid contract and he had to forfeit $140,000 in royalties to the government. The Snepp ruling has since become the legal basis for Reagan's government-wide censorship program, although constitutional lawyers question whether the court intended it to apply beyond the intelligence agencies.

Speaking of Snepp, Turner said in the interview, "We're caught on quite different dilemmas. My dilemma is that I did submit for clearance. He broke his contract."

He conceded, however, that both of them have been caught on the issue of whether there should be such secrecy agreements at all. The Reagan administration is "mishandling" the prepublication review program, he said, and is classifying so much information as secret that it is "engendering disrespect for the secrecy label." Some of the subjects he wants to write about, he said, are already in the public domain and are "in the public interest to know."

An incident involving his previous speeches was particularly galling to him. He said he had been having difficulties getting CIA approval for a particular section of his book and had sent for several speeches he had given on the subject. He then rewrote the section, quoting only his publicly spoken words. But the CIA still withheld approval. "On top of that," he said, other officials "have all said exactly what I wanted to say," either in speeches or in their writings. He said he has had to compromise in some areas of the book but still believes he can get across his message, although "not as clearly and as forcefully as I would like."

The CIA denies that it is being arbitrary with Turner or any other former official in its review of submitted material. Charles E. Wilson, who heads the agency's seven-member review board, said: "We don't impose censorship in a pejorative way. Our only concern is with classified material." Although there are some "areas of dispute" with Turner, he said, "my expectation is that they will be resolved."

The review board processed 274 manuscripts last year, he said, and more than 100,000 pages of text since the program began in 1977. It tries to get book manuscripts back within 30 days. "I challenge anyone to mention more than a handful of authors who have been vocally critical," he said.

Turner and Snepp, however, have been joined by two other ex-CIA men, Richard C. Rhodes and Ralph [illegible] review program.

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WASHINGTON POST
20 June 1984

U.S. Close to Violating ABM Treaty, Panel of Security Specialists Says

Associated Press

By pushing development of its "Star Wars" missile defense system, the Reagan administration is close to a clear U.S. violation of the 1972 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, a panel of security and arms control specialists said yesterday.

The panel is beginning what it calls a "national campaign to save the ABM treaty" by attempting to persuade Congress to refuse to provide funds for the new defensive system that would be partly based in space.

The campaign's 46 sponsors include former President Carter, former secretary of state Dean Rusk, former defense secretary Robert S. McNamara, retired Army Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor and former CIA directors Stansfield Turner and William E. Colby.

If the new strategic defensive system is deployed, it will intensify the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union and lead to decades of nuclear instability, the group contends.

Signed by President Richard M. Nixon and the late Soviet President Leonid I. Brezhnev, the 1972 ABM treaty bans all space-based ABM systems or any nationwide defense against missile attack. The theory is that the best preventive against nuclear war is the knowlege that it would be mutually destructive.

The treaty's supporters say its ratification paved the way for all subsequent negotiations aimed at reducing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

Gerard C. Smith, the chief U.S. arms negotiator at the time the ABM treaty was signed, said at a news conference at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that he believes—as he did in 1972—that the deployment of an effective, nationwide ABM system by one superpower would produce irresistible pressure on the other to deploy enough missiles to penetrate it.

That would lead to a tremendously increased arms race that would destroy arms control efforts, Smith said. "It seems to me we are on a slippery slope," he said. "We are already in an anticipatory breach of contract."

Smith, a former director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said the group leading the new campaign favors continuing research on advanced ABM systems as a hedge against a possible Soviet "breakout" from the terms of the 1972 accord.

"What we are objecting to is an American breakout," by the actual development and deployment of a space-based ABM system, he said.

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WASHINGTON TIMES
20 June 1984

CIA seems spooked by plot on pope

By Donald Neff
and Roger Fontaine
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Despite mounting evidence that the Bulgarian secret services had a direct hand in the 1981 assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II, there are widespread reports that the Central Intelligence Agency and the Reagan administration continue to show a reluctance to pursue the explosive matter.

The voluminous findings of Italian state prosecutor Antonio Albano detailing the Bulgarian connection have been appearing in U.S. newspapers for the past 10 days. Yet a survey of present and former American officials with intimate knowledge of the intelligence community strongly indicates that the CIA remains unmoved and unconvinced.

One major exception to this generally critical response was lodged by former CIA Director Stansfield Turner, who cautioned that "nobody knows what the CIA is thinking. It's secret. That's its nature."

If the agency has indeed been inactive, as most sources report, the reasons could be numerous, ranging from an aloof attitude of "it's an Italian affair" to a belief that the story is just too bizarre to be true, to apprehensions that more revelations would destroy the CIA's gentlemen's agreement with the Soviet intelligence community.

Yet the incident could go to the heart of the nature of America's relationship with the Soviet Union. For instance, Mr. Albano now believes that the Soviet Union had urged or acquiesced in having the Bulgarians plot to assassinate the pope in order to combat the Solidarity trade union and the Catholic Church in Poland.

The pope's death would have had a profound effect in his native Poland, no doubt destabilizing and perhaps even destroying the largely Catholic Solidarity uprising. The pope had become a rallying point for Polish anti-communists long before the assassination was attempted May 13, 1981.

He was shot and seriously wounded by a Turkish gunman, Mehmet Ali Agca, who has since provided details about being hired by Bulgarian agents to commit the deed. It was on the basis of a year-long interrogation of Agca that the Italian judicial authorities conducted an exhaustive investigation of the assassination plot.

Their conclusion, as expressed in Mr. Albano's still secret 78-page report filed May 8 in court, was that Bulgarian agents promised Agca more than $400,000 to commit the crime. Though the report makes no specific mention of the Soviet Union, Mr. Albano strongly suggested to the Associated Press yesterday that he believed Moscow had a hand in it.

"Do you think Bulgaria could do this sort of thing without Moscow's agreement?" he asked.

Despite these revelations, a number of sources told The Washington Times the CIA has been and remains largely indifferent to the investigation of the Bulgarian connection.

A former high CIA official who declined to be identified said flatly: "There's no doubt about it. The agency has not taken the Bulgarian connection seriously."

Equally outspoken has been Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato, a New York Democrat, who, according to a Wall Street Journal story late last year, returned from a visit to the Vatican in early 1983 and said at a press conference: "The CIA has conducted a war of silence, obstruction, and disinformation in this investigation." He called the CIA's conduct "shockingly inept."

Sen. D'Amato was reported yesterday to still hold those views.

A retired diplomat with close intelligence ties who asked not to be identified said his impression is that the CIA is doing its best to ignore the whole incident and its portentous implications. One of the reasons, he speculated, was intriguing:

"The CIA has an absolute fixation on the gentleman's agreement with the KGB [roughly, the Soviet equivalent of the CIA] about who you shoot and who you don't shoot.

"The old ground rules were very clear. Both sides could play around however they wanted to in Africa or Asia, but there was complete immunity on persons of political importance to each side. I would have thought this would have included the pope."

He speculated that if the old ground rules are indeed broken, then that is a momentous event for the CIA.

"I think they don't want to think about it," he said. "I assume they are shaken, concerned that the old rules have shifted, worried about what that really means in the world of international intrigue."

The former high CIA official had other reasons why the agency might not take the Bulgarian connection seriously.

"One, they got scooped and they are sore-headed about it," he said, alluding to the fact that the news organizations have appeared to be developing the story faster than intelligence services.

"Two, they don't have good contacts in Italy in this case. Their contacts there are in intelligence, but it was the judicial system that conducted the investigation.

"And three, they've been overly skeptical because the assassination attempt was so amateurish. They kept saying to themselves that pros wouldn't do it like this.

"Well, pros do do it like that sometimes."

An official still in government who has access to intelligence data on the case but who refused to be identified said the CIA still has not devoted enough assets to it, and shows no signs of doing so.

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RENO GAZETTE JOURNAL (NV)
18 June 1984

STAT

Ex-CIA director: Agency controls can go too far

By COURTNEY BRENN

Increased control by Congress over the Central Intelligence Agency "is likely to be bad in the long run" for administration-directed covert activities, former CIA Director Stansfield Turner said Sunday in Incline Village.

There is a danger that congressional oversight committees may go too far in monitoring the CIA, particularly in sensitive areas such as Nicaragua, he said before delivering a commencement address at Sierra Nevada College.

Turner was a Navy admiral and commander of the U.S. Second Fleet before being appointed CIA director by President Jimmy Carter in 1977. He left the post in 1981 and is now a private lecturer, TV commentator and writer.

"Citizens are the ultimate voice of the country," he said during a question and answer session. "But citizens can't be let in on every secret, so the government created surrogates (the House and Senate Intelligence Committees). Congress is given much more information about CIA activities (than before the committees were created in 1976)."

But Turner said increased oversight by Congress has its price.

The CIA had secretly been aiding Honduras-based, right-wing rebel forces trying to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua when Congress limited funds for covert activity in the Central American nation.

"Providing arms to the Contras in Nicaragua has divided the country. (It has) foreclosed on the President's ability to order covert action that is likely to be controversial, because it has to be approved."